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Abstract—We give new combinatorial constructions for codes
providing authentication and secrecy for equiprobable source
probability distributions. In particular, we construct an infinite
class of optimal authentication codes which are multiple-fold
secure against spoofing and simultaneously achieve perfect
secrecy. Several further new optimal codes satisfying these
properties will also be constructed and presented in general
tables. Almost all of these appear to be the first authentication
codes with these properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
The construction of authentication codes is an important
topic in cryptography, and has been considered by many
researchers over the last few decades. The first construction of
such codes go back to Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane [5],
using finite projective planes.
In this paper, we consider combinatorial constructions for
codes providing authentication and secrecy for equiprobable
source probability distributions. For general authentication
codes without any secrecy requirements, there exist various
constructions for a long time, regardless of the source dis-
tribution. However, if we wish that the authentication codes
simultaneously provide for secrecy, then there are only a
few constructions known, see e.g. [4], [8], [9], [13]. These
constructions are mostly of combinatorial nature, using combi-
natorial t-designs, perpendicular arrays, or orthogonal arrays.
An algebraic approach [4] is based on (non-)linear functions
between finite Abelian groups. In particular, Stinson [13]
constructed in 1990 optimal authentication codes that are one-
fold secure against spoofing and achieve perfect secrecy. His
constructions rely on Steiner 2-designs and assume that the
source states are equiprobable distributed (cf. Theorems 4
and 5).
We will extend Stinson’s constructions to obtain optimal
codes which are multi-fold secure against spoofing and provide
perfect secrecy. This can be achieved by means of Steiner
t-designs for larger t. Using Mo¨bius planes, and more gen-
erally spherical geometries, we will particularly construct a
new infinite class of optimal codes which are two-fold secure
against spoofing and achieve perfect secrecy (Section V). Sev-
eral further new optimal codes satisfying these properties will
be constructed and presented in general tables (Section VI).
Almost all of these appear to be the first authentication codes
with these properties.
The paper uses concepts from both combinatorial design
theory and the theory of authentication codes. Relevant defini-
tions will be summarized (Sections II and III) as well as results
on general authentication codes that are important for our
purposes (Section IV). The paper concludes with a discussion
on further research directions (Section VII).
II. AUTHENTICATION AND SECRECY MODEL
We rely on the unconditional (theoretical) secrecy model
developed by Shannon [10], and by Simmons (e.g. [12])
including authentication. We follow the description and notion
of [8], [13]. We also mention the recent reference work [9].
In this model of authentication and secrecy three partici-
pants are involved: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent.
The transmitter wants to communicate information to the
receiver via a public communications channel. The receiver
in return would like to be confident that any received infor-
mation actually came from the transmitter and not from some
opponent (integrity of information). The transmitter and the
receiver are assumed to trust each other. Sometimes this is
also called an A-code.
Let S denote a set of k source states (or plaintexts), M a
set of v messages (or ciphertexts), and E a set of b encoding
rules (or keys). Using an encoding rule e ∈ E , the transmitter
encrypts a source state s ∈ S to obtain the message m = e(s)
to be sent over the channel. The encoding rule is an injective
function from S to M, and is communicated to the receiver
via a secure channel prior to any messages being sent. For each
encoding rule e ∈ E , let M(e) := {e(s) : s ∈ S} denote the
set of valid messages. A received message m will be accepted
by the receiver as being authentic if and only if m ∈ M(e).
When this is fulfilled, the receiver decrypts the message m by
applying the decoding rule e−1, where
e−1(m) = s⇔ e(s) = m.
An authentication code can be represented algebraically by a
(b×k)-encoding matrix with the rows indexed by the encoding
rules, the columns indexed by the source states, and the entries
defined by aes := e(s) (1 ≤ e ≤ b, 1 ≤ s ≤ k).
A. Spoofing Attack and Perfect Secrecy
We are interested in the following scenario, which is called
spoofing attack of order i: Suppose that an opponent observes
i ≥ 0 distinct messages, which are sent through the public
channel using the same encoding rule. The opponent then
inserts a new message m′ (being distinct from the i messages
already sent), hoping to have it accepted by the receiver as
authentic. The cases i = 0 and i = 1 are called impersonation
game and substitution game, respectively. These cases have
been studied in detail in recent years, whereas less is known
for the cases i ≥ 2.
We assume that there are probability distributions pS on
S and pE on E (known to all participants) with associated
independent random variables S and E, respectively. These
distributions induce a third distribution, pM , on M with
associated random variable M . The deception probability Pdi
is the probability that the opponent can deceive the receiver
with a spoofing attack of order i.
Theorem 1: [Massey] In an authentication code with k
source states and v messages, the deception probabilities are
bounded below by
Pdi ≥
k − i
v − i
.
An authentication code is called t-fold secure against spoof-
ing if Pdi = (k − i)/(v − i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
In what follows, we are also interested in the property of
secrecy: An authentication code is said to have perfect secrecy
if
pS(s|m) = pS(s)
for every source state s ∈ S and every message m ∈M. That
is, the a posteriori probability that the source state is s, given
that the message m is observed, is identical to the a priori
probability that the source state is s. It can easily be shown
that
pS(s|m) =
∑
{e∈E:e(s)=m} pE(e)pS(s)∑
{e∈E:m∈M(e)} pE(e)pS(e
−1(m))
.
As a consequence, we have
Lemma 1: [Stinson] An authentication code has perfect
secrecy if and only if∑
{e∈E:e(s)=m}
pE(e) =
∑
{e∈E:m∈M(e)}
pE(e)pS(e
−1(m))
for every source state s and every message m.
Thus, if the encoding rules in a code are used with equal
probability, then a given message m occurs with the same
frequency in each column of the encoding matrix.
III. COMBINATORIAL DESIGN THEORY
For positive integers t ≤ k ≤ v and λ, a t-(v, k, λ) design
D is a pair (X,B), satisfying the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of k-subsets of X , called blocks,
(iii) every t-subset of X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
We will denote points by lower-case and blocks by upper-case
Latin letters. Via convention, let b := |B| denote the number
of blocks. Throughout this article, ‘repeated blocks’ are not
allowed, that is, the same k-subset of points may not occur
twice as a block. If t < k < v holds, then we speak of a non-
trivial t-design. For historical reasons, a t-(v, k, λ) design with
λ = 1 is called a Steiner t-design (sometimes also a Steiner
system). As a simple example, let us choose as point set X =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and as block set B = {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 5},
{3, 4, 6}, {4, 5, 7}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 6, 7}, {1, 3, 7}}. This gives a
Steiner 2-(7, 3, 1) design, the well-known Fano plane, which
is the smallest design arising from a projective geometry. The
usual representation of this unique projective plane of order 2
is given by the following diagram:
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Fig. 1. The Fano plane
If a 2-design has, like in this example, equally many points
and blocks, i.e. v = b, then we usually speak of a symmetric
design. For the existence of t-designs, basic necessary condi-
tions can be obtained via elementary counting arguments (see,
for instance, [1]):
Lemma 2: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design, and for
a positive integer s ≤ t, let S ⊆ X with |S| = s. Then the
number of blocks containing each element of S is given by
λs = λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
(
k−s
t−s
) .
In particular, for t ≥ 2, a t-(v, k, λ) design is also an
s-(v, k, λs) design.
It is customary to set r := λ1 denoting the number of blocks
containing a given point (referring to the ‘replication number’
from statistical design of experiments, one of the origins of
design theory). It follows
Lemma 3: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then
the following holds:
(a) bk = vr.
(b)
(
v
t
)
λ = b
(
k
t
)
.
(c) r(k − 1) = λ2(v − 1) for t ≥ 2.
There are many infinite classes of Steiner t-designs for t = 2
and 3, however for t = 4 and 5 only a finite number are known.
For encyclopedic accounts of key results in design theory as
well as existence tables with known parameter sets, we refer
to [1], [2].
Problem 1: Does there exist any non-trivial Steiner t-design
with t ≥ 6?
IV. GENERAL AUTHENTICATION CODES
For general authentication codes, no secrecy requirements
are specified. We summarize the state-of-the-art with respect
to our further purposes:
The following theorem (cf. [8], [11]) gives a lower bound
on the number of encoding rules for any source probability
distribution.
Theorem 2: [Massey–Scho¨bi] If a general authentication
code is (t − 1)-fold against spoofing, then the number of
encoding rules is bounded below by
b ≥
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) .
As usual, we call a code optimal if the number of encoding
rules meets the lower bound with equality. When the source
states are known to be independent and equiprobable, optimal
authentication codes which are (t − 1)-fold against spoofing
can be constructed via t-designs (cf. [3], [11], [13]):
Theorem 3: [DeSoete–Scho¨bi–Stinson] Suppose there is a
t-(v, k, λ) design. Then there is an authentication code for k
equiprobable source states, having v messages and λ ·
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing.
Conversely, if there is an authentication code for k equiprob-
able source states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding
rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing, then there
is a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design.
V. AUTHENTICATION CODES WITH PERFECT SECRECY
Stinson [13, Thm. 6.4] constructed in 1990 the first optimal
authentication codes that are one-fold secure against spoofing
and simultaneously achieve perfect secrecy. His constructions
rely on Steiner 2-designs and assume that the source states are
equiprobable distributed.
Theorem 4: [Stinson] Suppose there is a Steiner 2-(v, k, 1)
design, where v divides the number of blocks b. Then there
is an optimal authentication code for k equiprobable source
states, having v messages and v(v − 1)/k(k − 1) encoding
rules, that is one-fold secure against spoofing and provides
perfect secrecy.
Using Steiner 2-( q
d+1−1
q−1 , q+1, 1) designs whose points and
blocks are the points and lines of projective spaces PG(d, q),
Stinson [13, Thm. 6.5] constructed this way an infinite class
of authentication codes with the following properties:
Theorem 5: [Stinson] For all prime powers q and for all
even d ≥ 2, there is an optimal authentication code for an
equiprobable source probability distribution with q+1 source
states, having (qd+1 − 1)/(q − 1) messages, that is one-fold
secure against spoofing and provides perfect secrecy.
The smallest example is as follows (cf. [13, Ex. 6.1]):
Example 1: An optimal authentication code for k = 3
equiprobable source states, having v = 7 messages, and b = 7
encoding rules, that is one-fold secure against spoofing and
provides perfect secrecy can be constructed from a Steiner
2-(7, 3, 1) design, i.e. the unique Fano plane illustrated in
Fig. 1. Each encoding rule is used with probability 1/7. An
encoding matrix is given in Table I.
TABLE I
AUTHENTICATION CODE FROM THE FANO PLANE
s1 s2 s3
e1 1 2 4
e2 2 3 5
e3 3 4 6
e4 4 5 7
e5 5 6 1
e6 6 7 2
e7 7 1 3
We will extend Stinson’s constructions to obtain optimal
codes which are multi-fold secure against spoofing and provide
perfect secrecy. This can be achieved by means of Steiner
t-designs for larger t.
Theorem 6: Suppose there is a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design,
where v divides the number of blocks b. Then there is an
optimal authentication code for k equiprobable source states,
having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t−1)-
fold secure against spoofing and provides perfect secrecy.
Proof: Let D = (X,B) be a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design,
where v divides b. We mimic the proof of [13, Thm. 6.4].
Clearly, the authentication capacity of the code follows via
Theorem 3. To establish perfect secrecy under the assumption
that the encoding rules are used with equal probability, it is
necessary in view of Lemma 1 that a given message occurs
with the same frequency in each column of the resulting
encoding matrix. This can be done by ordering every block
of D in such a way that every point occurs in each possible
position in precisely b/v blocks. Since every point occurs in
exactly r =
(
v−1
t−1
)
/
(
k−1
t−1
)
blocks due to Lemma 3 (c), neces-
sarily clearly k must divide r. To show that the condition is
also sufficient, we consider the bipartite point-block incidence
graph of D with vertex set X ∪B, where (x,B) is an edge if
and only if x ∈ B for x ∈ X and B ∈ B. An ordering on each
block of D can be obtained via an edge-coloring of this graph
using k colors in such a way that each vertex B ∈ B is adjacent
to one edge of each color, and each vertex x ∈ X is adjacent
to b/k edges of each color. Technically, this can be achieved
by first splitting up each vertex x into b/k copies, each having
degree k, and then by finding an appropriate edge-coloring of
the resulting k-regular bipartite graph using k colors. Taking
the ordered blocks as encoding rules, each used with equal
probability, establishes the claim.
Relying on Mo¨bius planes, and more generally on spherical
geometries, we can now construct a new infinite class of
optimal codes which are two-fold secure against spoofing and
achieve perfect secrecy.
Theorem 7: For all prime powers q and for all even d ≥ 2,
there is an optimal authentication code for an equiprobable
source probability distribution with q+1 source states, having
qd + 1 messages, that is two-fold secure against spoofing and
provides perfect secrecy.
Proof: Steiner designs can be constructed from spherical
geometries as follows: Let q be a prime power, and d ≥ 2 an
integer. As point set X choose the elements of the projective
line GF (qd) ∪ {∞} over the Galois field GF (qd), where ∞
denotes a symbol with ∞ /∈ GF (qd). The linear fractional
group
PGL(2, qd) = {x 7→ ax+b
cx+d : a, b, c, d ∈ GF (q
d), ad−bc 6= 0}
acts on GF (qd) ∪ {∞} in the natural manner (with the
usual conventions for ∞). As block set B take the im-
ages of GF (q) ∪ {∞} under PGL(2, qd). This gives a
3-(qd + 1, q + 1, 1) design with PGL(2, qd) as group of au-
tomorphisms. These designs were first described by Witt [14].
For d = 2, they are often called Mo¨bius planes (or inversive
planes) of order q.
Now, if we assume that d is even, then
q2 − 1 | qd − 1
and hence
(q + 1)q(q − 1) | qd(qd − 1).
Therefore, v divides b, and the claim follows by applying
Theorem 6.
We present the smallest example:
Example 2: An optimal authentication code for k = 4
equiprobable source states, having v = 10 messages, and
b = 30 encoding rules, that is two-fold secure against spoofing
and provides perfect secrecy can be constructed from a Steiner
3-(10, 4, 1) design, i.e. the unique Mo¨bius plane of order 3.
Each encoding rule is used with probability 1/30. We give an
encoding matrix in Table II.
Remark 1: We mention that the group PGL(2, qd) acts
transitively on incident point-block pairs, i.e. on the flags, of
the Steiner 3-(qd + 1, q + 1, 1) design. This reveals a high de-
gree of regularity of the combinatorial structure. Basically all
flag-transitive Steiner t-designs have been determined recently,
see [6]. Various further interactions between highly regular
combinatorial structures and applications in information and
coding theory can be found, e.g., in [7].
VI. FURTHER CONSTRUCTIONS
We will construct several further new optimal authentica-
tion codes for equiprobable source distributions, which are
(t−1)-fold secure against spoofing and simultaneously achieve
perfect secrecy. All codes with t ≥ 3 appear to be the first
authentication codes satisfying these properties.
In view of Theorem 6, we have to check whether the
parameters of known Steiner t-(v, k, 1) designs satisfy the
condition that v divides the number of blocks b =
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
.
We recall that there are two infinite classes of optimal authen-
tication codes: one arises from projective geometries (Theo-
rem 5) and the other from spherical geometries (Theorem 7).
We can construct further infinite families of optimal codes for
a fixed number of source states as follows:
• A Steiner 2-(v, 3, 1) design (so-called Steiner triple sys-
tem) exists if and only if v ≡ 1 or 3 (mod 6). Hence,
if v ≡ 1 (mod 6), then an optimal authentication code
can be constructed for k = 3 equiprobable source states,
TABLE II
AUTHENTICATION CODE FROM THE MO¨BIUS PLANE OF ORDER 3
s1 s2 s3 s4
e1 1 2 4 5
e2 2 3 5 6
e3 3 4 6 7
e4 4 5 7 8
e5 5 6 8 9
e6 6 7 9 0
e7 7 8 0 1
e8 8 9 1 2
e9 9 0 2 3
e10 0 1 3 4
e11 1 2 3 7
e12 2 3 4 8
e13 3 4 5 9
e14 4 5 6 0
e15 5 6 7 1
e16 6 7 8 2
e17 7 8 9 3
e18 8 9 0 4
e19 9 0 1 5
e20 0 1 2 6
e21 1 3 5 8
e22 2 4 6 9
e23 3 5 7 0
e24 4 6 8 1
e25 5 7 9 2
e26 6 8 0 3
e27 7 9 1 4
e28 8 0 2 5
e29 9 1 3 6
e30 0 2 4 7
having v messages, and v(v − 1)/6 encoding rules, that
is one-fold secure against spoofing and provides perfect
secrecy.
• A Steiner 2-(v, 4, 1) design exists if and only if v ≡ 1
or 4 (mod 12). Hence, if v ≡ 1 (mod 12), then
an optimal authentication code can be constructed for
k = 4 equiprobable source states, having v messages,
and v(v − 1)/12 encoding rules, that is one-fold secure
against spoofing and provides perfect secrecy.
• A Steiner 2-(v, 5, 1) design exists if and only if v ≡ 1
or 5 (mod 20). Hence, if v ≡ 1 (mod 20), then
an optimal authentication code can be constructed for
k = 5 equiprobable source states, having v messages,
and v(v − 1)/20 encoding rules, that is one-fold secure
against spoofing and provides perfect secrecy.
• A Steiner 3-(v, 4, 1) design (so-called Steiner quadruple
system) exists if and only if v ≡ 2 or 4 (mod 6). Hence,
if v ≡ 2 (mod 24), then an optimal authentication code
can be constructed for k = 4 equiprobable source states,
having v messages, and v(v−1)(v−2)/24 encoding rules,
that is two-fold secure against spoofing and provides
perfect secrecy.
TABLE III
FURTHER AUTHENTICATION CODES FROM STEINER t-DESIGNS
t k v b Design Parameters Design Reference
3 5 26 260 3-(26, 5, 1) Denniston design
5 11 66 4-(11, 5, 1) Witt design
7 23 253 4-(23, 7, 1) Witt design
5 23 1.771 4-(23, 5, 1) Denniston design
5 47 35.673 4-(47, 5, 1) Denniston design
4 5 83 367.524 4-(83, 5, 1) Denniston design
5 71 194.327 4-(71, 5, 1) Mills design
5 107 1.032.122 4-(107, 5, 1) [2]
5 131 2.343.328 4-(131, 5, 1) [2]
5 167 6.251.311 4-(167, 5, 1) [2]
5 243 28.344.492 4-(243, 5, 1) [2]
6 12 132 5-(12, 6, 1) Witt design
5 6 84 5.145.336 5-(84, 6, 1) Denniston design
6 244 1.152.676.008 5-(244, 6, 1) [2]
We present further optimal codes that are (t−1)-fold secure
against spoofing and achieve perfect secrecy in Table III. We
give the parameters of the authentication codes as well as of
the respective Steiner t-designs. All presently known Steiner
4-designs and 5-designs have been examined; for Steiner
2-designs and 3-designs only the cases up to v = 30 have
been investigated. We refer to [1], [2] for further information
on the respective designs.
VII. DISCUSSION
It would be interesting for further research to examine
authentication codes that are (t−1)-fold secure against spoof-
ing and achieve two-fold perfect secrecy, and more generally
(t − 1)-fold perfect secrecy. For this the following condition
must be satisfied: for every t∗ ≤ t − 1, for every set M∗ of
t∗ messages observed in the channel, and for every set S∗ of
t∗ source states, we have p(S∗|M∗) = p(S∗).
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